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The Bank-Depositor RelationshipA Comparison of the Present Tennessee Law
and the Uniform Commercial Code
John A. Spanogle, Jr.*
The author examines the relationship of the bank and its depositor
under existing Tennessee law and then points out changes and modi-

fications which would arise under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Professor Spanogle notes that many of the problems discussed are not

governed by statute in Tennessee and that the case law is unclear in

certain areas. This is one of his reasons for recommending the adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code by the Tennessee legislature.**

It has been said many times that a bank is a debtor of its depositor,
or that a bank is an agent of its depositor in paying out money from
his account. Both of these descriptions are too general, however,
to be very helpful in solving specific problems arising from concrete
situations.' Instead, it is much more helpful to examine the various
rights and duties of the two parties which are created by their relationship, without reference to the use of similar theories in other
fields.
The depositor expects, in general, to have four rights concerning
the money he places in an account with a bank: (1) the right to
order that money be paid out to discharge any of his checks or
other orders drawn against sufficient funds, (2) the right that his
money be paid out only to discharge valid orders from him, (3)
the right to revoke any of his orders before they have been paid
by the bank, and (4) the right to have checks deposited to his
account collected by the bank and credited to his account. In return,
the bank expects the depositor to take reasonable care to prevent
abuses of his rights under the deposit contract, and to attempt to
discover any such abuses so as to prevent their repetition. This in*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
The author wishes to thank Professor Paul J. Hartman who made many valuable
suggestions during the preparation of this article. It should be understood, however,
that Professor Hartman is not to be held responsible for the views expressed herein.
**As this issue goes to press, the Uniform Commercial Code has just been introduced
in the General Assembly.
1. The general principles of agency law are not always applicable to the bankdepositor relationship, which has developed many specific rules contrary to those
applicable to other agency relationships. The same is true as to general principles
from other fields of law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), AGENCY § 173 (1958);
Note, 23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 198 (1961); and Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit
Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537 (1913).
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volves such duties of the depositor as: (1) maintaining a sufficient
balance in his account to cover his checks when they are presented,
(2) signing his checks in a recognizable form, (3) issuing checks in
a manner which will prevent defalcations by others, and (4) examining returned checks and statements for such defalcations.
Each of the rights of the depositor creates a corresponding duty
on the bank, a violation of which may make it liable for losses caused
by the violation. Thus, a bank may be liable ff it: (1) refuses to pay
a valid order of the depositor, (2) pays out the depositor's funds
without a valid order from him authorizing such a payment, (3)
pays an order which the depositor has previously revoked, or (4)3
fails to collect the proceeds of checks deposited by the depositor.

On the other hand, failure of the depositor to perform his duties
may relieve the bank of liability. Thus, the bank may defend against
liability by showing that: (1) the depositor's balance was insufficient
to cover his check, (2) his signature was unrecognizable, (3) he was
careless in issuing the check, or (4) he failed to examine his returned
statement or report discovered defalcations.
One purpose of this article is to examine these bases of a bank's

liability and its defenses under the present Tennessee law.4 It is

useless to consider only the present law in this area, however, for the
Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. or the Code]
will affect substantial portions of it. The U.C.C. has now been
adopted in eighteen states, including most of the commercially important states5 and the neighboring states of Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Georgia. More states may be expected to join this list in the near
future.6 As more states adopt the Code, lawyers in the remaining
states will need to know its provisions for two reasons. An understanding of the Code will be necessary for lawyers in order to advise
clients on interstate commercial transactions, 7 and also to predict the
2. Discussion of this field involves two separate problems:
a) Was the order received by the bank valid? and b) Has the bank paid out
the depositor's funds without even a purported order from him?
3. An exhaustive study of check collection problems is in itself a sufficient subject
for a complete article. Therefore, this article will examine such problems only insofar
as they affect the first three sources of a bank's liability. See Part V infra. For a
more thorough discussion of collection problems, see the authorities cited in note 202
infra.
4. Many of the problems in this area have not been brought before the Tennessee
courts or acted upon by the Tennessee legislature. Where these problems have wellsettled solutions, it will be assumed that Tennessee would follow that law, and
treatises or cases from other jurisdictions will be cited. Where there is no settled answer
or a substantial split of authority in other jurisdictions, this fact will be noted.
5. New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Nev Jersey.
6. See, e.g., the report of a California State Bar Committee urging that California
adopt the U.C.C. 37 J. STATE BAR CAL. 117 (1962).
7. The U.C.C. contains its own conflict of laws provisions (see § 1-105) and the
provisions give very broad jurisdiction to use the Code in the courts of any state
which has enacted it.
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answers which their own courts will formulate to solve new and de-

veloping problems in the commercial law field.8 Further, any state not
adopting the U.C.C. will be handicapped in commercial transactions
by operating under two sets of laws in interstate transactions and by
operating under more restrictive financing methods." It is, therefore, quite likely that Tennessee will adopt the U.C.C., and probably
in the near future. Thus, a second purpose of this article is to
ascertain the rules regulating a bank's liability and defenses under
the U.C.C., and to compare these rules to the present Tennessee law.
I. REFUSAL

To PAY

The depositor's primary purpose in opening a checking account is
to draw checks against it. He expects the bank to pay these checks.
When a bank refuses to pay a depositor's check, it may thereby become liable to him under what is popularly known as a "slander of
credit suit." 0 A bank, however, is not liable for all refusals to
pay depositors' checks, but only for wrongful refusals to pay. The
problem thus becomes one of defining "wrongful," which can best be
done by determining what refusals to pay are not wrongful. No
element of malice or deliberateness is required by the term, for
wrongful refusals to pay may be either willful or inadvertant." All
that is required is a refusal, for any reason, to pay a recognizably
valid order drawn on sufficient funds.
It is obvious that a bank may refuse to pay checks drawn on insufficient funds. A bank may pay overdrafts, but it is under no
8. See, e.g., Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817,
822 n.9 (3d Cir. 1951). "We think provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which
do not conflict with statute or settled case law are entitled to as much respect
and weight as courts have been inclined to give the various Restatements. It, like the
Restatements, has the stamp of approval of a large body of American scholarship."
Ibid. See also Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 726 (Ore. 1962).
9. For an explanation of the advantages of the Code's financing devices, see
SPrvAx, SEcxamEi TnAUsAcONS (1960); Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REv.
838 (1959); Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Without Help or Hindrance of the "Floating Lien," 15 Bus. LAw. 373 (1960); and
Bunn, Financing Dealers: Existing Wisconsin Law and the Uniform Code, 37 MAIIQ.
L. REv. 197 (1953).
10. This action may be based either in tort or in contract. The theoretical basis
used may make a difference in the way damages are measured, or in the statute of
limitations used. In Tennessee, both theories are available, J. M. James Co. v. Bank,
105 Tenn. 1, 58 S.W. 261 (1900), but the measure of damages is controlled in part by
statute. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-419, -420 (1956). See text accompanying note 20
infra.
11. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-419, -420 (1956) provide liability where the refusal
is inadvertant. In either tort or contract, all that is required is a breach of a duty.
Intent therefore is not relevant.
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obligation to do so.' 2 A refusal to pay on grounds of insufficient
funds is therefore not wrongful. Such an insufficiency must have
been caused by previous valid orders from the depositor, however.
A refusal to pay because of insufficient funds is wrongful, if the depletion of the depositor's account
was due to a wrongful payment for
3

which the bank is liable.'

The bank may also refuse to pay a check having a signature which
is not recognizably the depositor's genuine signature. 4 There are
two facets to this problem: (1) the handwriting may not be recog-

nizable as the depositor's handwriting; and (2) the name, as used
in the signature, may not be in the same form as it appears on the
signature card. (J. A. Spanogle vs. John A. Spanogle.) The first
issue poses an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. And in at

least one Tennessee case, a signature not recognizable to the bank
was recognizable to the jury.15 On the second issue, the Tennessee

law seems to be that form differences do not invalidate a check. At

least, it has been held that a bank may pay such a check, 16 so that
such a payment is authorized; and a refusal to make any authorized
17
payment is arguably wrongful.
The U.C.C. would not change any of the above rules. Section
4-402 reaffirms the basic rule that wrongful dishonor includes both
inadvertant and willful refusals to pay valid orders. The Code does
not attempt to define the term "wrongful" further. This would mean
that the more detailed Tennessee rules would remain unchanged.
A bank may be forced into delaying payment when a third party
notifies it of an adverse claim to the account. Such delay, if pro12. The payment of a check causing an overdraft is considered a loan to the depositor, and may be recovered as such. This rule is incorporated in the U.C.C. §
4-401. If the depositor is a corporation, however, the signor of the checks causing
the overdraft must have authority to procure loans as well as authority to sign checks.
If the signor for the corporation does not have this authority, the bank may recover
from the corporate depositor only the amount it benefitted from the overdrafts.
Hennessey Bros. & Evans Co. v. Memphis Nat'l Bank, 129 Fed. 557 (6th Cir. 1904).
This quasi-contractual measure of recovery means that the bank is liable for defalcations through unauthorized employee overdrafts, but may recover any funds properly
put at the disposal of the company.
The bank may allow a custom to arise that it will honor the depositor's overdrafts.
Such a privilege may be withdrawn by the bank at any time. First Nat'l Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 216-17, 154 S.W. 965, 968 (1912). Nor must
the bank notify the depositor before it can withdraw the privilege, for the depositor's
reliance seems irrelevant. If, however, the payee or holder knows of the custom
and he relies thereon when accepting a check, the bank's ability to withdraw the
privilege and dishonor that check seems limited. Ibid.
13. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Importers' & Traders' Bank, 119 N.Y. 195, 2.3 N.E.
540 (1890); American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Gregg, 138 Ill. 596, 28 N.E. 839 (1891).
14. American Nat'l Bank v. Miles, 18 Tenn. App. 440, 79 S.W.2d 47 (M.S. 1934).
15. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Ivey, Civil No. 9961-2, M.S., Tenn. App., Dec. 4, 1959.
16. American Nat'l Bank v. Miles, supra note 14.
17. RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 146, comment f; §§ 385(l), 400 (1958).
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longed, may result in the dishonor, under the Deferred Posting
Statute, 8 of checks presented for payment. If the third party fails
to prove his claim, such dishonor would be wrongful. This problem
will be discussed more fully under Wrongful Payment, Part III.19
The measure of damages for a wrongful refusal to pay a check
is controlled partly by statute and partly by case law. The old
Tennessee rule was that a jury could assess general damages, without
specific proof, if the depositor was a merchant.20 This is similar to
the common law measure of damages in libel or slander per se. 2'
Thus rule, however, has been abrogated in part by statute, so that
proof of actual damages is now required in all cases where the refusal
to pay was inadvertant, not malicious.2 The statute's limitation on its
applicability presumably means that the case-law rule is still applicable to malicious refusals to pay.
Actual damages, in order to be recoverable, must be proximately
caused by the bank's refusal to pay. This raises the question of the
foreseeability of indirect losses resulting from the refusal. This
question in measuring damages is most dramatically presented when
the depositor has been arrested under a Bad Check Law because of
the bank's refusal to pay his check 3 Such damage has been ruled
foreseeable in Tennessee, and is therefore recoverable. 24 Whether this
ruling may be extended to cover other indirect losses25 is impossible
to predict.
In ascertaining damages, the Code expressly codifies both Tennessee rules.2 Actual damages must be proved where the refusal
to pay is inadvertant, not malicious. Also, damages from an arrest
or prosecution of the depositor may be recovered as being proximately caused. In other indirect loss situations,2 7 the issue of proximate cause is question of fact for the jury.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-417, -418 (1956). The length of the delay required
has not been specified in the cases, but it must be more than a few hours. Miller v.
Bank of Wash., 176 N.C. 152, 96 S.E. 977 (1918). The delay is usually required
to be a sufficient length of time to give the claimant an opportunity to assert his
claim in court. See note 125 infra. This should be less than the two days allowed
by the Deferred Posting Statute; however, checks presented for payment, but still
unpaid at the time of the notification of the adverse claim, would still present the
above problem.
19. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
20. J. M. James Co. v. Bank, supra note 10.
21. See Paossan, TORTS 590-91 (2d ed. 1955).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-419, -420 (1956).
23. Other situations where proximate cause problems may arise involve the cancellation of insurance policies or the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien due to
the refusal to pay a check for a premium or an installment.
24. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Ivey, supra note 15.
25. See note 23 supra.
26. U.C.C. § 4-402.
27. See note 23 supra.
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A bank may incur liability not only by wrongfully refusing to pay
a check, but also by wrongfully paying one. The depositor expects
the bank to pay from his account only on orders from him, and only
when those orders are valid. As to the validity of checks, the most
common defect encountered is a forgery, either of the depositor's
signature or of an indorsement. Other types of defects include material alterations and staleness. As to the requirement of an order from
the depositor himself, a court or a third party may order the bank
to pay out the depositor's funds; or the bank may seek to use his
account to pay debts he owes to it. Under some circumstances, these
claims may be paid and charged to the depositor's account without
even a purported order from him.2 The problems involving payment
without any purported order from the depositor will be discussed in
Part III.
In all situations involving wrongful payment, there are at least two
parties to whom the drawee bank may look for possible reimbursement. It may attempt to charge the depositor himself, and it may
also attempt to recover from the collector-the prior holder or collecting bank who was paid by the drawee bank. It may be able to
recover from both, from only one, or from neither of these parties; but
the liability of each party should be examined in every situation, and
should be examined separately. Since these two avenues of recovery
are interrelated, both must be examined in order to present a clear
picture of the bank-depositor relationship. Thus, in considering the
rules applicable to each type of defect, recovery possibilities both
against the depositor and against the collector will be examined in
this article.

A. FORGED CHEcKs
A bank may not charge to the depositor's account a check bearing
either a forged drawer's signature2 9 or a forged indorsement unless
the depositor is, in the words of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(N.I.L.), "precluded from setting up the forgery."30 This means
that the bank must show that the depositor was negligent in his
handling of the check in order to shift the loss to him. Although the
negligence of the depositor may preclude him from asserting a defect
28. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
29. As used herein, the term "forged signature" will include all unauthorized
signatures, whether the forger purports to act as an agent or not. The rules applicable
to all unauthorized signatures are almost identical, differing only in the applicability

of the doctrine of ratification. On other issues the same rules apply, so that the inclusive term "forged signature" may be used. See UNwom~f NECOT ABLE INsTrUMNTs
LAW § 23 [hereinafter cited as N.I.L.]; BmrroN, Bau.s & NOTES 362 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BUrON].

30. N.I.L. § 23, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-123 (1956).
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in both forged drawer's signature and forged indorsement cases, the
rules defining negligence in the two situations are quite different.
In both types of cases the depositor may be negligent either in the
execution of the check or in failing to discover and report the forgery
after his statement is returned to him.
The U.C.C. would spell out the case-law rules on wrongful payment
of defective checks, which are now implied from the N.I.L. or carried
over from the common law. It would make few changes in the
presently-settled rules, but it would decide most of the unresolved
questions. The Code's rules on forged checks are divided into four
sections. Section 4-401 sets up the basic rule that a defective check
may not be automatically charged to the depositor's account. 31
Section 3-406 then provides an exception to this rule where the
depositor is negligent in the execution of the check. Section 4-406
provides a like exception where the depositor is negligent in failing
to discover and report the defect. Section 4-207 covers the bank's
ability to recover from prior holders and collecting banks.3
Courts in Tennessee, and in other states, have found few instances
of negligence by the depositor in the execution of checks bearing a
forgery of his signature.m One reason for this is that merely placing
an employee who later defalcates in a position of trust where he
can forge4 checks does not constitute such negligence. Giving him
such a position may, however, clothe the employee with apparent
authority, which will also preclude the depositor from relying upon
m
forgery.3
On the other hand, the depositor is more likely to be held negligent
in the execution of a check bearing a forged indorsement than in the
execution of one bearing a forgery of his signature. Such negligence
31. Section 4-401 of the U.C.C. provides that the bank may charge the depositor's
account with checks which are "properly payable." Checks are not properly payable
if they bear a forged drawer's signature (§ 3-401), a forged indorsement (§ 3-404),
or a material alteration (§ 3-407).
32. Section 3-417 provides similar remedies to those in § 4-207. The remedies in the
latter section are expressly applicable to the check collection process, however.
33. The one Tennessee case on point involved a forged promissory note which was
secured by a mortgage properly signed the same day. Denison-Gholson Dry Goods Co.
v. Hill, 135 Tenn. 60, 185 S.W. 723 (1916). The court held that the maker's execution
of the mortgage, which clearly referred to the forged note, precluded her from
setting up the forgery of the note. Id. at 71. More common examples of such negligence from other states include negligent keeping of a signature stamp or of
signed blank checks which are used without authorization by employees or strangers.
See 2 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1797 (1942) [hereinafter cited as PATON].
34. Including checks executed without authority. See note 29 supra.
35. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), AGENcY § 173 (1958). The bank may be liable
for conversion, however, if it has notice that the employer's checks are issued for the
signing employee's personal use. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat'l Bank,
173 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949). Cf. United States Guar. Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank,
189 Tenn. 143, 223 S.W.2d 519 (1949).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

is best illustrated by the "fictitious payee" situation. In this situation,

an employee who has no authority in himself to sign checks, or who

needs a co-signor to issue valid checks, makes out checks payable
to other employees for work they have not done, or to suppliers for

materials they have not provided. He has these checks signed by the
authorized corporate signor, but does not deliver them to the named

payees. Instead, the dishonest employee forges the payee's signatures
thereon and cashes them. The Tennessee courts have ruled that the
depositor may be negligent in the execution of such checks, if they
are issued without first checking his records of hours worked and
good received.3 If the records to be checked are those of a sub-

contractor, however, the depositor has no duty to check such records

before signing checks.3 7 Even if the depositor does not check his
own records, the bank must show that this negligence "substantially

contributed" to the dishonest employee's scheme before the depositor
is precluded from asserting the forgery.3 Thus, if the scheme has
been perpetrated by the depositor's own employee, and the depositor

has not set tip an accounting system reasonably calculated to prevent
such defalcations, the loss will fall on the depositor. If the scheme

has been perpetrated by a sub-contractor, or the depositor has used
a reasonable accounting system, the loss will fall on the bank.39

In Tennessee, the preclusion due to negligent conduct has hereto-

fore been based upon equitable estoppel theory.40 Thus, to preclude
the depositor from asserting the forgery, the bank must show that

the depositor's conduct misled the bank and caused it to change
its position justifiably in reliance upon the misrepresentation. 41 The
bank must show that it has not been negligent; 4 a but, even though it
36. United States Guar. Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, supra note 35.
37. McCann Steel Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, 47 Tenn. App. 287, 337 S.W.2d 886
(M.S. 1960). The distinction is probably based on the relative accessibility of the
different sets of records.

38. Ibid.

39. The bank may also argue that the use of a fictitious payee made the check
payable to bearer, so that proper indorsements are not required. N.I.L. § 9(3). TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-109(3) (1956). This argument fails in this state because the Tennessee courts have ruled that such checks do not become bearer paper unless
every signer of the check knew that the payee would have no interest in the check.
McCann Steel Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, supra note 37. See Spanogle, Bills and Notes
-1961 Tenn. Survey, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1135 (1961). The U.C.C. would change this
rule. U.C.C. § 3-405. See note 47 infra.
40. Denison-Gholson Dry Goods Co. v. Hill, supra note 33. According to Britton,
an estoppel theory will never protcet the bank from a one-time forgery. BnrrroN
368. This is quite correct where the payment precedes the depositor's negligence.
See note 51 infra. It is not necessarily true, however, where the depositor's negligence
precedes the bank's payment, as in the negligent execution situation. In the latter
case, the negligence may well mislead the bank and cause the payment: thus providing
the requirements for an estoppel in pais.
41. Furnish v. Burge, 54 S.W. 90 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
41a. McCann Steel Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, supra note 37.
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may seem to have been negligent in paying the check, it may still
be protected if it can produce evidence that its course of conduct,
which would ordinarily be classified as negligent, was both justified
and caused by the depositor.4 Such conduct is not in fact negligent,
but is reasonable under the circumstances. Such justification might
be shown by evidence of use of standard banking procedures. On
the other hand, the bank might be required to show affirmatively
that it has not been negligent in any way not related to its reliance
43
on the customer's misrepresentation.

The U.C.C. does not alter the present rule that a bank may not
charge a defective check to the depositor's account unless the depositor is precluded from setting up the defect.4 Nor does it change
the present rule that a depositor's negligence in executing a check
may so preclude him, even against a holder in due course or the

bank.45 Further, it does not attempt to define what conduct will

be considered negligent. 46 Thus, the present Tennessee rules concerning the depositor's negligence in executing a check would not be
changed by the U.C.C., nor would the further development of such

rules by the Tennessee courts be affected.47 The Code does state that

42. McCann Steel Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, supra note 37, at 298, 337 S.W. 2d at
891.
43. Id. at 301, 337 S.W.2d at 892. "The Bank cannot shift its primary responsibility
unless it can point to some act on the part of the Steel Company which caused
the Bank to act as it did."
44. U.C.C. §§ 4-401, 3-404.
45. U.C.C. § 3-406. The preclusion is based upon an estoppel theory, as it is under
present Tennessee law. See note 40 supra, and U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 5.
46. "No attempt is made to define negligence which will contribute to an alteration.
The question is left to the court or the jury upon the circumstances of the particular
cases. Negligence usually has been found where spaces are left in the body of the
instrument in which words or figures may be inserted. No unusual precautions are
required, and the section is not intended to change decisions holding that the drawer
of a bill is under no duty to use sensitized paper, indelible ink or a protectograph;
or that it is not negligence to leave spaces between the lines or at the end of the
instrument in which a provision for interest or the like can be written." U.C.C. §
3-406, comment 3.
"The section applies the same rule to negligence which contributes to a forgery
or other unauthorized signature, as defined in this Act (Section 1-201). The most
obvious case is that of the drawer who makes use of a signature stamp or other
automatic signing device and is negligent in looking after it. The section extends,
however, to cases where the party has notice that forgeries of his signature have
occurred and is negligent in failing to prevent further forgeries by the same person.
It extends to negligence which contributes to a forgery of the signature of another, as in
the case where a check is negligently mailed to the wrong person having the same
name as the payee. As in the case of alteration, no attempt is made to specify what
is negligence, and the question is one for the court or the jury on the facts of the
particular case." Id., comment 7.
47. The negligence rules concerning the fictitious payee situation would not be
changed. The bearer paper rules of that situation would be changed, however, where
the defalcating employee is a co-signer of the checks. § 3-405. See note 39 supra. The
present Tennessee law is a minority view. See Morris, Fictitious Payees on Checks
Requiring Dual Signatures, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 439.
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the negligence must "substantially contribute" to the alteration or
forgery in order to preclude the depositor from asserting the defect,
which is also true under present Tennessee law.48 Moreover, the
bank's payment must be in accordance with "reasonable commercial
standards." This means that negligence of the bank in failing to
discover the defect will prevent it from taking advantage of the
estoppel.49 It also means that the justifiable reliance principle of
estoppel law would be retained, and that the burden of proof placed
on the bank in this situation is spelled out.
Where the drawer's signature has been forged, negligence in discovering the forgery is a much more common ground for preclusion
than is negligence in the check's execution. This preclusion is based
on an estoppel theory in Tennessee." As in the negligent execution
situation, the bank must show that the depositor's conduct misled
the bank and caused it to change its position in reliance thereon.5'
Failure to discover a forged drawer's signature on a check will
52
therefore not estop the depositor if there is but one such forgery;
the bank has already paid the check before the depositor's failure to
discover, so that no misrepresentational act of the depositor led the
bank to pay the check. If there is a series of such forgeries, however,
the bank may argue that it was misled by the failure to discover and
that this omission caused the losses on all checks paid after the failure.
Thus, the bank would be liable for the first checks in a series of
forgeries, but not for later defalcations. 53 A separate problem arises
where there is but one forgery, and the forger remained in the jurisdiction for some time after the forgery should have been discovered.
Here, the depositor's failure has cost the bank an opportunity to
recover from the forger, but the loss is not due to misrepresentation.
Estoppel theory will therefore not protect the bank, but a breach
of contract theory would. 54 This theory of recovery has never been
48. U.C.C. § 3-406. As to the present
49. U.C.C. § 3-406,

law, see note 37 supra.

comment 6.

50. Furnish v. Burge, supra note 41. A forged check may not be ratified in Tennessee, although an unauthorized signature by one who purports to act as the drawer's
agent may be. Boone v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 154 Tenn. 241, 290 S.W. 39
(1927). Ratification of the unauthorized signature would permit the drawee bank
to recover on each check so ratified, without proof that it had been misled. BmrrON
367.
51. Furnish v. Burge, supra note 41.
52. Ban-roN 367; 2 PATON 1881.
53. Critten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902); BrnrroN
370; 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 356, at 744 (1938).
54. The theory is that the depositor's negligence has breached the contract of deposit. The theory allows the bank to preclude the assertion of the forgery whenever
the depositor's negligence has caused a loss, whether that negligence led the bank
to pay the check or not. The forger's delayed escape or insolvency is sufficient to
establish that the loss is due to the depositor's failure. BRa-roN 368.
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by the Tennessee courts, so its availability is undeterconsidered
55
mined
The depositor has no duty, however, to examine returned checks
for forged indorsements, because he cannot compare the indorsements
to the genuine signature of others.56 Although one case indicated
that there may be an exception to this rule where the depositor possesses the payee's signature, the exception has never been applied
by the Tennessee courts. 57 Thus, there will be few instances of
depositor negligence in the discovery of forged indorsements after
payment of the check.m There is, however, a statutory provision in

the nature of a statute of limitations which bars assertion of any
and asserted within six years of the
defect unless it is discovered
59

return of a statement.

Unlike the present Tennessee case law, the U.C.C. would provide
specific rules on the extent of the duty of the depositor to discover

defects in checks returned to him by the bank. Section 4-406 recognizes a difference between defects which may be discovered by the

use of reasonable care and those which are so artfully done that

detection by ordinary means is impossible. The Code does not at-

tempt to define the amount of investigation required to comply with
the "reasonable care" standard. The entire concept seems new to Tenlaw, but this is primarily because there are no cases in the
nessee
60
area.

Only forged drawer's signatures are forgeries which may be discovered by the use of reasonable care.61 Thus, the depositor would
still have no duty to examine his returned checks for forged indorse55. Furnish v. Burge, supra note 41, considers only estoppel and ratification theories,
but does not expressly reject others. Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177
Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76 (1940) permits use of both estoppel and breach of contract theories to prevent the depositor's recovery on an untimely discovered raised
check. See note 90 infra. This preclusion is not based upon N.I.L. § 23, however.
See note 89 infra.
56. United States Guar. Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, supra note 35; Darling
Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 165, 156 S.W.2d 419 (1941).
57. Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 227 N.Y. 510, 125 N.E. 824
(1920), cited with approval in Darling Stores, note 56 supra, at 171, held that, if
the depositor has the payee's signatures, the rationale of the rule is not valid, so that
whether the depositor has a duty to examine becomes a question of fact for the jury.
This rule has been ignored in cases where it would have been applicable, including
Darling Stores, therefore weakening its value.
58. Presumably, a failure to notify the bank after receiving actual knowledge of the
forged indorsement could estop the depositor from asserting later forgeries of the
same indorser's signature. The U.C.C. would not change this rule. § 4-406, comment 6.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-432 (1956).
60. Although Furnish v. Burge, supra note 41, involved failure to discover a forgery,
it did not inolve a check returned by the bank to its depositor after payment and
cancellation.
61. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
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ments, as is true under the present Tennessee law.62 If the depositor is
negligent in not discovering a discoverable defect and his negligence
causes the bank a loss, he is precluded from later setting up the
defect.6 The negligence of the depositor, therefore, will not protect
the bank from the one-time forger who immediately leaves the
state or becomes insolvent. If, however, a series of forgeries perpetrated over a period of time 6" is involved, the depositor's negligence seems conclusively presumed by the Code to have caused the
bank a loss, and liability will fall on the depositor. Also, if the forger
remains in the jurisdiction for "a reasonable time" after the items
are returned by the bank, the depositor's negligence will place the
loss on him. The former rule conforms to present Tennessee law, and
the latter decides a question presently open in this state.65 On the
other hand, if the depositor can establish lack of ordinary care by the
bank in paying the defective checks, the bank may not assert the
depositor's later negligence in failing to discover the defect.6
If the defects are not discoverable, the preclusion rules do not
apply. The Code does, however, provide rules in the nature of statutes
of limitations to cut off the assertion of these defects.61 These rules
are similar to Tennessee Code Annotated section 45-432, but with
shorter time limits. Instead of six years to object to defects, the depositor would have one year to discover and object to forgeries of his
own signature and alterations, and three years for forged indorsements. These rules would not be affected by any negligence of the
bank.
Against the collector-the holder or collecting bank paid by the
depositor's drawee bank-the depositor's bank's right of recovery depends upon whether the forgery is of the drawer's signature or of an
indorsement. Once the bank has paid a check bearing a forged
drawer's signature, it may not subsequently charge the check back
62. A depositor having notice of a forged indorsement would be required by the
Code to report this fact to his bank, if such is the present law. U.C.C. § 4-406, comment 6. As to the present law, see note 58 supra. Cf. note 57 supra.
63. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(a).
64. The loss caused by the depositor's negligence includes only those checks paid
fifteen days or more after the bank returns the first defective items to the depositor for
inspection. § 4-406(2) (b).
65. The former rule is based upon an estoppel theory, and the courts have held
that this theory is valid in Tennessee. Furnish v. Burge, supra note 41. The latter
rule is based upon a breach of contract theory, which does not require a misrepresentation to the bank before it pays the defective check. See BmTTON 367. This theory
has not yet been considered by the Tennessee courts, so its validity in this state
is still an open question. See note 55 supra.
66. U.C.C. § 4-406(3). This procedure follows estoppel theory, but shifts the burden
of proof to the party who is trying to establish another's negligence.
67. U.C.C. § 4-406(4).
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to any prior holders for value who did not know of the forgery.0
This is the old common law rule of Price v. Neal,69 which has been
followed in Tennessee since the adoption of the N.I.L.70 The bank
admits the genuineness of its depositor's signature by accepting or
paying the check under N.I.L. section 62. 71 Any failure to recognize
a forgery of that signature is deemed to be negligence by the bank,
making it liable for the loss. If the collector knew of the forgery, the
bank may charge the amount of the check back to him. 72 If the
collector had no actual knowledge of the forgery, however, but was
only negligent in not investigating the status 73of the person whom he
paid, the bank may not recover from him.
Where the bank has paid a check bearing a forged indorsement,
it may subsequently recover the amount of that check from the
collector, even if he purchased the check for value and in good faith.74
The bank's recovery rights are different from those in the case of the
forged drawer's signature because the bank does not have the payee's
genuine signature to compare to the indorsements. Thus, the recovery
is upon a quasi-contractual basis. Such recovery is not available
against a collecting agent or bank after it has paid the proceeds to its
principal.75 Recovery is available against such agents only upon a
warranty theory, but the warranties of the N.I.L. do not run to
drawee banks under Tennessee law.76 Drawee banks, therefore, must
68. Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 378, 193 S.W. 117, 122 (1916). Thus the
bank may recover from two classes of persons: 1) donees of the forger; and 2) persons
obtaining payment in bad faith.
69. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
70. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 115 Tenn. 64, 88 S.W. 939
(1905).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-162 (1956).
72. Such knowledge would give the bank an action in fraud or deceit, in which
the bank's mere negligence would not be relevant. This may mean that a holder
in due course who obtained the instrument without knowledge of the forgery, or even
one who later had the check certified without such knowledge, may be liable to the
bank if he was notified of the forgery before receiving payment. There is no Tennessee
law on this issue. For a discussion of the common law solution to the problem, see
Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARv. L. REv. 297, 301 (1891); Note, 23
U. Prrr. L. REv. 198 (1961).
73. Figuers v. Fly, supra note 68, at 378, overruling a prior case, People's Bank v.
Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S.W. 716 (1889), which had allowed recovery from
a negligent collector.
74. Figuers v. Fly, supra note 68, at 375.
75. National Park Bank v. Eldred Bank, 90 Hun 285, 35 N.Y. Supp. 752 (Sup. Ct.
1895), aff'd, 154 N.Y. 769, 49 N.E. 1101 (1897); National Park Bank v. Seaboard
Bank, 114 N.Y. 28,-20 N.E. 632 (1889).
76. Figuers v. Fly, supra note 68, at 377. The warranties of N.I.L. § 66, TENN.
§ 47-166 (1956), are only negotiation warranties, not presentment warCODE AN1.
ranties. They do not run to the drawee bank because it is not a holder in due course
and because a presentation for payment is not a negotiation. It should be noted that
only N.I.L. §§ 62, 66 have any application to the bank's liability for paying forged
checks, and that neither of them directly solves the problems in the field. Thus, all
of the rules discussed are a case-law gloss upon the statute.
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rely upon an express "Prior Indorsements Guaranteed"
warranty
77
stamp, if any, to recover from collecting banks.
Against prior holders, the U.C.C. provides that the payment of a
check by a drawee bank to a holder in due course is final, except for

liability for breach of warranty.78 The bank's ability to recover from

prior holders and collecting banks is therefore placed upon a war-

ranty basis, and presentment warranties are provided. 79 These warranties are statutory, and thus are applicable whether or not a "Prior
Indorsements Guaranteed" stamp is added to a collecting bank's

indorsement. 80

The present case-law distinction between the drawee bank's recovery rights on forged drawer's signatures and forged indorsements
is maintained. The prior parties warrant that they have good title,81

which means they warrant all prior indorsements necessary to their
title. The drawee bank may recover from them if any such indorse-

ment is forged. The warranty of good title does not, however, warrant
that the check itself is genuine, so warranties of the drawer's signature
are treated separately. Prior parties warrant only that they have no
knowledge that the drawer's signature is forged. 82 Thus there is no
right of recovery from any holder in due course who in good faith
presented the check for payment. 3 There is, however, a right of

recovery against holders not for value, whether or not they had
knowledge of the forgery.4 These rules conform to the present Tennessee law.ns
77. Such warranty stamps are required by the Federal Reserve and most clearing
houses. 12 C.F.R. § 210.5 (1959).
78. U.C.C. § 3-418.
79. U.C.C. §§ 4-207, 3-417. This is a change from the N.I.L., which provides only
transfer warranties. If a prior party has breached a presentment warranty, the bank
may employ any remedy normally available for breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 3-417,
comment 1. Thus, it may rescind its acceptance or payment and charge back the
amount credited to prior parties; or it may sue for damages, including reasonable
collecting expenses and attorneys fees. U.C.C. § 4-207, comment 5. It must, however,
pursue its remedy within a reasonable time after discovering the breach, or the
prior parties will be discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay. U.CC.
§ 4-207(4).
80. U.C.C. § 4-207(3). The statutory warranties cover not only forged indorsements, but also material alterations. U.C.C. § 4-207(1) (c).
81. U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(a).
82. U.C.C. § 4-207(1) (b).
83. An exception to this rule is made for a holder in due course, which may be
a collecting bank, who either obtains the instrument or has it certified without knowledge of the defect, and obtains payment after learning of the defect. Under § 4-207
(1)(b)(iii), the bank may not recover from him. His good faith at the time he
obtained the instrument itself or a certification of it insulates him from liability.
At present, Tennessee has no rule to cover such a situation.
84. U.C.C. § 3-418 makes final only payments to holders in due course. Donces
of the forger could not qualify for such final payment.
85. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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B. ALTEE

CBECKS

When a check has been materially6 altered, the bank may 'not
automatically charge the check in its altered form to the depositor's
account. It may charge the depositor's account only according to the
checek's original tenor,8 7 unless the depositor has been negligent in
executing the instrument." To charge the depositor, the bank must
itself be without fault and the depositor's negligence must proximately
cause the payment in altered form.8 9 Where the depositor has been

negligent, he has both breached a contractual duty owed the bank
and misled the bank by his actions. Thus, the bank may either seek

to shift the loss to him under a breach of contract theory or defend

against a suit by the depositor under an estoppel theory.90 However,

the proximate cause requirement is not well defined in this state.
The only Tennessee case on point held that the requirement was met

when the depositor (1) authorized the payee to fill out the check
(2) in pencil and (3) permitted blank spaces to be left before the

amount.0 1 Whether less extreme negligence, involving only one of

these three faults, would also be held sufficiently causal is still
undecided.9 2 The effect of the depositor's failure to discover 9altera3
tions when his checks are returned is also an open question.
The Code would continue the presently-settled rules. The bank
86. See N.I.L. § 125, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-156 (1956), listing the types of
alterations considered material. The types of alterations considered material under the
U.C.C. are defined in § 4-407.
87. N.I.L. § 124, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-255 (1956). If the amount of the check
has been altered, the bank may charge the account with the original amount. If
the payee's name has been altered, the entire payment is wrongful, and no amount may
be charged to the depositor's account. If the date of a post-dated check has been
altered, the charge must be delayed until proper.
88. Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
89. Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., supra note 55. The "criminal instrumentality rule" does not limit the depositor's duty to execute the check properly.
There is nothing in N.I.L. § 124 to indicate that the depositor's negligence may preclude him from setting up the alteration. Britton argues that section 23 provides this
result, because "forgery," as used in that section, should include material alterations.
BRTTON 367. The Tennessee court relied on common law, not statutory, principles to
reach its decision, however.
90. Both theories are mentioned in Foutch, note 55 supra, and neither is said to
be exclusive. Either remedy would permit the bank to recover, but the estoppel
theory would also permit a holder in due course to recover the altered amount from a
negligent drawer.
91. Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., supranote 55.
92. For a survey of cases on this subject from other jurisdictions, see 1 PATON
111, 116-19. But see BnrrroN 666, for a contrary conclusion on the effect of the same
cases.
93. It would seem that the same principles would apply to discovery of altered
checks as to the discovery of checks bearing forged drawer's signatures. Both should
be regulated by equitable estoppel doctrines. This is the majority view in other
states. BRITTON 362; 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 356, at 743 (1938). Therefore,
for more detailed rules regarding the depositor's liability for failing to discover the
alteration of his checks, see text accompanying notes 50-67 supra.
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could charge the depositor's account only according to the check's
original tenor, unless the depositor is precluded by his negligence
from asserting the alteration.9 4 Negligence in the execution of the
check must "substantially contribute" to the alteration in order to
preclude the depositor 5 As with forged checks, there is no attempt
to define the conduct which would meet this proximate cause test, 96
so that the present confusion in the Tennessee law in this area would
not be clarified. Another unresolved problem, however, would be
answered. Under the Code material alterations are defects which
are discoverable, so that the depositor would have a duty to examine
his returned checks for alterations, and failure to discover them
could preclude him from asserting the defect.9 7 The specific rules as
to the depositor's duty to examine for alterations are the same as
those concerning his duty to examine for forgeries of his signature.9 8
Recovery by the bank against prior holders on altered checks was
allowed at common law, on a mistake of fact theory.99 Under the
N.I.L., however, there is a conflict of authority on the issue, a minority
holding that section 62 has changed the common-law rule. 00 Such
a case has not yet arisen in Tennessee, so this issue is presently
undecided. The Code would provide a definite answer to this question-drawee banks would be allowed to recover from prior parties
on altered checks. 1' 1 As with forged indorsements, the recovery would
be on a statutory warranty basis. 02 Thus the Code would solve two
out of three unresolved major problems in the altered check field.
C.

STALE CHECKS

A stale check is not per se defective, but its staleness deprives a
purchaser of the status of a holder in due course and puts the bank
on inquiry as to its right to pay the check.'03 This means that the
94. U.C.C. § 3-407. See also §§ 3-406, 4-406.
95. U.C.C. § 3-406.
96. Ibid. See text accompanying notes 91 and 92 supra.
97. U.C.C. § 4-406.
98. Ibid. See text accompanying notes 50-67 supra.
99. Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Comst. 230 (N.Y. 1850).
100. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d

781 (1931); National City Bank v. National Bank, 219 Ill. App. 343, 132 N.E. 832
(1921); Kansas Bankers Surety Co. v. Ford County State Bank, 184 Kan. 529,
338 P.2d 309 (1959). The majority view is that the common law rule is unchanged.
101. U.C.C. § 4-207(lc). An exception is provided for checks which have been
certified before alteration and a partial exception for ones certified after alteration.
U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(c)(iii). In the latter case, a bank may not recover from any
holder in due course who took the check after certification. Thus, the negotiability of
certified checks is strengthened because a person who purchases a check after
certification may enforce the check against the bank for its face amount, whether
altered or not.
102. See note 100 supra.
103. 1 PATON 1108.
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depositor may assert against the bank any of the defenses which
negotiability cuts off, if the facts so warrant. Thus, a stale check is not
necessarily defective, but the bank is shorn of its normal defenses
if there is a defect somewhere in the background. Although the one
10 4
Tennessee court presented such a fact situation ignored this doctrine,
a bank which pays such a check bears the risk of loss if such a
defect is present, under the existing law. 10 5 On the other hand, a
refusal to pay a stale check creates the risk of a slander of credit
suit, if there is no infirmity in the instrument. 1 6 The often-repeated
recommendation is that the bank contact the depositor before paying
to ascertain whether it is irregular. This may be impossible in many
cases, and is economically unfeasible as a standard procedure. Thus,
the present law provides no guide as to how a bank may safely handle
a stale check presented to it for payment. Nor does the N.I.L.
provide any standard to determine precisely when a check becomes
stale. Section 53 makes a check stale when it "is negotiated an
unreasonable length of time after its issue."10 7 Banking custom in
various states sets the time limit as six months or a year after issue.
In Tennessee there is a statement in a 1917 case that demand paper
becomes stale in two to six months, 1 8 but this is not very definite
either.
Section 4-404 of the Code provides that the staleness of a check
no longer puts a bank on inquiry as to its right to pay the check.
As long as payment is in good faith, a bank may pay checks even
though they are over six months old. Banks may also refuse to pay
104. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 165 Tenn. 66, 52 S.W.2d 149
(1931). The defendant drawer seems to have argued that the check was stale, but
the court never considered that argument. Instead, the court held that N.I.L. § 186
offered no defense, which, although true, was not relevant. See note 107 infra. The
court also stated that the facts of the case were analogous to a Kansas case which did
not involve a stale check, again indicating its unawareness of the staleness issue. Therefore, the decision cannot be read to eliminate stale check problems from the present
Tennessee law. Cf. Easley v. East Tenn. Nat'l Bank, 138 Tenn. 369, 198 S.W. 66
(1917).
105. Staleness deprives a purchaser of the status of a holder in due course. N.I.L.
§ 53, TENN. CODE AwN. § 47-153 (1956); State & City Bank & Trust Co. v. Hedrick,
198 N.C. 374, 151 S.E. 723 (1930); La Due v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Minn. 33, 16
N.W. 426 (1883). Thus, the depositor may assert against the purchaser defenses
based upon the underlying transaction, even if the purchaser is the drawee bank.
Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa. 357 (1852).
106. Banking custom and statutes in some states permit a bank to refuse payment
of a stale check without liability for wrongful dishonor. See 1 PATON 1110. Tennessee has no such legislation.
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-153 (1956). It should be noted that staleness is
not the same concept as a statute of limitations. Only the negotiability is destroyed
by staleness, not the obligation itself. Nor is § 186 of the N.I.L. involved. The issue
is not necessarily whether the delay has caused a loss to the depositor, but whether
the depositor has any defense to the obligation.
108. Easley v. East Tenn. Nael Bank, supra note 105, citing several decisions from
other states, each having a different time limit.
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such checks without fear of a slander of credit suit. Thus, under the
Code, a bank has the option to pay or not to pay a check over six
months old, and runs no risk in taking either course of action. Under
the present law, a bank presented a six months old check does not
know whether it is stale; and, even if it did, it runs a discernable risk
whether it pays the check or not.
III. WRONGFUL PAYmNT: No PURPORTED ORDER FROM THE DEPOSiTOR

Wrongful payment comprises not only the payment of defective
checks, but also payments which are not ordered by the depositor.
For example, a bank using electronic signature codes may find that
a third party has written a check on a check form bearing the depositor's electronic signature. The bank's computer will charge the
depositor's account; but obviously this charge may not stand, even
though the check itself is valid, because the bank has no order from
him. There are two well-known exceptions to the rule that a bank
may pay only orders from the depositor. One exception is the banker's set-off-the banker's right to pay debts owed by the depositor to
the bank out of his deposit. The second exception is the payment of
a third party under a court order109
It is axiomatic that a depositor could not successfully sue his bank
for monies in his account if he owed the bank a greater amount under
a matured note. The bank could assert an equitable set-off against
the account and prevent recovery." 0 On the same reasoning, a bank
may refuse to pay the depositor from his account if the depositor
owes it a greater matured debt."' Since the depositor's checks are
not an assignment of the funds in his account, 12 the bank may also
debit the account and refuse to pay the depositor's checks." 3 If it
does so, it has exercised what is commonly known as a "banker's lien"
or set-off.
There are, however, two rigid limitations on the types of debts
which may be the object of a banker's set-off. First, the debt must be
liquidated-i.e., it must be reduced to precise figures, or capable of
being made certain by calculation without the intervention of a jury
109. Payments under either of these claims may cause a depletion of the depositor's
account, so that his checks are dishonored for insufficient funds. Such a dishonor
will not subject the bank to liability if the depletion was due to a payment within
the limits of the recognized exceptions. If the claims paid are outside these limits,
however, the bank will be liable for both the wrongful payment and the wrongful
refusal to pay the depositor's checks. The claim of insufficient funds will not protect
the bank where the insufficiency is due to a wrongful payment. See note 13 supra.
110. Ford v. Harrison, 150 Tenn. 369, 265 S.W. 89 (1924).
111. Doughty-Stephens Co. v. Greene County Union Bank, 172 Tenn. 323, 112
S.W.2d 13 (1937).
112. N.I.L. § 189, TEN . CODE ANN.§ 47-406 (1956).
113. People's State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123
(1937).
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to estimate the sum. 114 Thus, a set-off may not be used to satisfy

a debt arising out of a breach of contract, unless the bank has
obtained a judgment ascertaining the amount of damages. On the
other hand, a set-off may be used to satisfy a matured promissory
note, even if it bears interest and the amount of interest must be
calculated. Secondly, the debt must be matured." 5 Thus, any judgment relied upon must be final, and any note must be past-due. A
clause may, however, be accelerated to
note having an acceleration
6
meet this requirement."
Since the primary effect of the assertion of a banker's set-off is to
permit dishonor of the depositor's checks, an important question is

when must the bank assert its rights in order to dishonor checks
validly. This question is especially important where an acceleration

clause is used to mature an obligation under a note. Two rules may
be regarded as settled. Checks which have been paid or certified will

not be affected by the bank's debit of the account, for they have

already become obligations of the bank."1 7 Checks which are pre-

sented after the set-off is asserted may be validly dishonored for
insufficient funds, for the bank has no obligation to the holders before presentment." 8 There is still a problem concerning checks which
have been presented, but not paid, before the bank's assertion of a
set-off. This problem arises most clearly when the bank attempts to
mature an obligation by use of an acceleration clause after the
presentment of a large check. In one case, the bank was permitted
to assert its set-off and dishonor the check, but in that case the depositor himself had presented the check for payment to himself." 9
The majority view, however, seems to be that the bank may not
assert its set-off after presentment. 20
114. Carsey v. First Nat'l Bank, 11 Tenn. App. 137 (M.S. 1929), quoting from
Tallapoosa County Bank v. Wynn, 173 Ala. 272, 55 So. 1011 (1911).
115. Ibid.
116. State Natl Bank v. Towns, 36 Ala. App. 677, 62 So. 2d 606 (1952).
117. A bank which has honored an overdraft by payment or certification may not
recover from prior holders. BnrrroN 388.
118. The bank is not liable to a holder on the check itself until it has accepted
the check, because a check does not operate as an assignment of the funds in an
account. N.I.L. § 189, TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-406 (1956).
119. Bank of Commerce v. Franklin, 90 Ill. App. 91 (1900). This situation should
be distinguished from the case where the bank asserts its set-off after the presentment
of a garnishment order, because there is a right of set-off against such orders.
State Nat'l Bank v. Towns, supra note 116.
120. See 3 PATON 3369. The leading case on point is Niblack v. Park Nat'l Bank,
169 IM. 517, 48 N.E. 438 (1897). However, that case was decided on the theory
that "the drawing and delivery of a check . . . is an assignment" of funds in an
account. This theory is no longer correct. N.I.L. § 189. A sounder theory is that
the drawee is the holder's agent for collection once a check has been presented, and
that it cannot act for its own benefit to the detriment of its principal. Kilsby v.
Williams, 5 Barn. & Ald. 815, 106 Eng. Rep. 1388 (K.B. 1822) (bank may not
assert its own debt against the deposit); Florida Citrus Exch. v. Union Trust Co., 244
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A bank may not pay to third parties funds from its depositor's
account unless it has been authorized or directed to do so by the
depositor himself or a court.' 21 The mere fact that a third party has
obtained a judgment against the depositor, or holds his matured
note, will not permit the bank to pay out his funds. 122 Either a court
order directing the bank to pay from the account, such as a writ of
garnishment,m or a note authorizing payment by the bank, such as
a note "payable at" the bank,2 4 is required before payment is proper.
The bank is not, however, completely without obligation to a third
party who makes a claim, but has not procured a court order. At
common law, notice to a bank of an adverse claim to a deposit
created a duty on the bank to withhold payment from the account
for a sufficient time to give the claimant an opportunity to assert
his claim in court 2 - A bank so notified risks liability if it either pays
the depositor's checks or withholds payment of them. If it pays after
notice, and the claimant substantiates his claim, it may not charge the
account.26 On the other hand, if it refuses to pay, and the claim is
ill-founded, it may be liable for wrongful dishonor.2 1
The U.C.C. impliedly authorizes payments under a banker's set-off
or a court order by providing priorities for the payment of such
items. 28 It does not attempt to establish a comprehensive rule covering the validity of such items, but merely sets forth rules as to
when such items must be asserted in order to affect the depositor's
checks. Any such items asserted by the bank or third party may take
precedence over any check not yet certified or paid. Thus, under the
Code, a bank may mature a note by the use of an acceleration clause
and assert its right of set-off to deplete the depositor's account after
App. Div. 68, 278 N.Y. Supp. 313 (1935) (bank may not delay payment and pay
other checks); Joy v. Grasse, 173 Minn. 289, 217 N.W. 365 (1927) (bank may not
assert its own debt where account is for a special purpose).
121. Grissom v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 87 Tenn. 350, 10 S.W. 774 (1889); Carsey
v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 114.
122. Ibid.
123. The bank may enforce its right of set-off before honoring such a writ. State

Nat'l Bank v. Towns, supra note 116.
124. N.I.L. § 87, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-218 (1956). U.C.C. § 3-121 contains
alternative sections allowing a state to make notes "payable at" a bank equivalent to
checks, or not so equivalent. The proposed Tennessee statute adopts the alternative
making them not equivalent, which would change the present law.
125. Miller v. Bank of Wash., 176 N.C. 152, 96 S.E. 977 (1918); Gendler v.
Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Iowa 1945)

(Semble).

126. Ibid. The U.C.C. would not solve this problem. Although § 3-603 concerns
payment with knowledge of an adverse claim, it is limited to claims to the check
itself, and the claims in the above cases were to the deposit.
127. See note 14 supra.
128. U.C.C. § 4-303.
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the presentment for payment of the depositor's checks. It may then
validly dishonor those checks for insufficient funds.'2

IV.

REVOCAT ONS oF AuTrorry

A. SToP PAYMENT ORDEBtS
While the depositor wants assurances that the bank will pay his
checks, he also wants to be able to stop such payment by revoking
the bank's authority to pay particular checks, and to be able to require
the bank to obey such revocation orders. The common law granted
him the right to stop payment on checks for good reason, or for no
reason at all.'30 If the bank obeys his stop payment order and refuses
to pay the check, it is protected from both the depositor and the
holder of the check. It is protected from the depositor because the
stop order authorizes the refusal to pay; and from the holder, including a holder in due course, because it can become liable on the check
only by accepting it, which it has not done.' 3 ' The pronouncement by
one Tennessee court that a check must be paid over a stop order if
presented by a holder in due course, would seem incorrect in view of
later statements by the courts. 32 If the bank does pay, through inadvertance or negligence, the relationships become more complex. It
is, however, clear that the bank has violated one of its duties to the
depositor, so that it has no right to charge the check automatically
to the depositor's account; 33 the payment is initially out of the bank's
own funds. The Code also recognizes the right of the depositor to
stop the payment of his checks, and the duty of the bank to follow
such instructions from him. 134 The bank may not automatically charge
129. See Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Under the U.C.C., 15 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 565, 575 (1954).
130. 3 PATON 3447; 7 Am. Jur. Banks § 602 (1937).
131. N.I.L. § 189, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-406 (1956).
132. H. L. Buchanan & Co. v. Madison Bank & Trust Co., 7 Tenn. App. 373 (M.S.
1927). But see Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking Co., 189 Tenn. 220, 224, 225
S.W.2d 38, 40 (1949); Third Nat'l Bank v. Carver, 31 Tenn. App. 520, 218 S.W.2d
66 (M.S. 1948); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 165 Tenn. 66,
52 S.W.2d 149 (1932); Pease & Dwyer v. State Nat'l Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 88 S.W.

172 (1905).
The Buchanan decision is also incorrect in theory. Although a holder in due course
may have a valid right to recover on the check from the drawer, this fact does not
affect the bank's duty to obey the drawer's stop payment order. Nor does the bank
have any obligation to pay a stopped check merely because it has been presented by a
holder in due course, for the check, even in his hands, is not an assignment of the
drawer's funds. N.I.L. § 189, TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-406 (1956).
133. Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking Co., supra note 132; Third Nat'l Bank
v. Carver, supra note 132.
134. U.C.C. § 4-403(1). Only the depositor may give the bank a binding stop
order. The bank is not bound to recognize such orders from the payee or other
holders, but may do so at its option. This decides one question which has not arisen
in Tennessee but which has vexed courts in other states. Although payees have no
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the payment to the depositor's account, 13 5 because it is prima facie
136

liable for the loss.

This result does not change even if the bank has used a stop pay-

ment order form containing an exculpatory clause. Such clauses
presently in use in Tennessee' 37 are probably invalid for two reasons.

First, clauses which seek to protect a bank against its own negligence
seem to be invalid, being against public policy, and Tennessee courts

have so held.138 Also, because the bank has not promised to do
anything, there is no consideration in a stop order form for such a

clause, so that the clause cannot be binding upon the depositor.130

Under the Code, exculpatory clauses may not shift the loss to the

depositor if they attempt to disclaim liability for "failure to exercise ordinary care."

40

This is true even though the Code gives wide

right to order payment stopped, Polotsky v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del. (7 W.W.
Harr.) 151, 188 Ad. 63 (1936), a stop order has been held sufficient to put the bank
on notice of equities against the check, so that subsequent payment was improper.
Public Grain & Stock Exch. v. Kune, 20 Ill. App. 137 (1886). Payment when on
notice of adverse claims to the check is allowed in many situations by U.C.C. §
3-603.
135. Payment of such a check would not be "a proper payment" under U.C.C. § 4-401.
The provision that the depositor has the burden of proving a loss in § 4-403(3) may
seem contra, as though it means that no recredit of the account is necessary. This provision, however, only assigns the burden of proof for actions in court, U.C.C. § 1-201
(8), and thus does not affect the bank's proper conduct upon discovery of the improper
payment. Leary, supra note 129, at 581-82. Three arguments would support this
reading: (1) The bank is prima facie liable for payment over a stop order under the
Code, § 4-407, comment 1; (2) U.C.C. § 1-201(B) defines "burden of establishing"
as concerning only a party's burden of proof in court; and (3) All of the bank's recovery rights are expressly based upon subrogation theories, and subrogation to the
rights of others is not available until the bank has paid out its own funds. See text
accompanying notes 149, 154 infra.
136. U.C.C. § 4-407, comment 1.
137. A common such clause reads: "Should this check be paid through inadvertance,
accident, or oversight, it is expressly agreed that the bank will in no way be held
responsible."
138. Speroff v. First-Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948);
Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 120 Tenn. 225, 111 S.W. 248 (1908).
139. Calamita v. Tradesmen Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949); BrTToN
521.
If the exculpatory clause were part of the original deposit contract and placed on
the signature card rather than the stop order form itself, it would be supported by
adequate consideration through the implied promise of the bank to act as the depositor's
agent. The argument that such a clause is contrary to public policy might still be
valid, but those courts which have considered the problem have indicated otherwise.
Haman v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1962); Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1951). Thus,
an exculpatory clause incorporated in the signature card may protect the bank against
its own negligence. This would not be possible under the U.C.C. See notes 140-41
infra and accompanying text.
As to the advisability of including such clauses, even if invalid, for in terrorem
value, see Commrru ON PROFESSiONAL ETIcs OF THE AssOCIATION OF THE BAn
OF T=E Crry OF NEw YoRx, OPnUoNs OF PROFESSIONAL ETrmcs 435 (1956).
140. U.C.C. § 4-103(1). Thus, disclaimers of liability for "oversight, inadvertance,
or mistake" would be invalid. Leary, supra note 129, at 581.
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power to the parties to vary their obligations by agreement between
themselves. 141 This power of agreement is well-known to present
Tennessee law, 142 and is analogously limited by the state public policy
against clauses which protect the bank against liability for its own
negligence. 14 3
Even though the depositor's account may not be automatically
charged in this situation, other methods of recovery may be available
to the bank. Since the situation involves an improper payment, the
bank may also have recovery rights against prior holders. Recovery
possibilities against both of these parties must be examined in order to
present a clear picture of the bank-depositor relationship, because the
rights are interrelated. Recovery against either party may be possible
under the check itself or through subrogated rights under the underlying transaction. Thus, there are four methods of recovery which
may be attempted. The bank may sue the depositor and it may sue
prior parties. Further, against each of these it may sue both under
the check itself and through subrogated rights under the underlying
transaction.
After payment of a check over a stop payment order, the bank
is a transferee and possessor of that negotiable instrument. It is not,
however, either a holder or a holder in due course because there has
been no negotiation to it.144 If the bank received the check from a
holder in due course, it can argue that it is subrogated to that holder's
rights as an equitable purchaser, and may enforce the check against
the depositor. This argument is probably not valid in Tennessee.
Although one case seems to support the argument,145 a later case
found "no force" in it.1'
Under the Code, this rule would be changed. The bank would
succeed to the rights of any holder in due course from whom it had
purchased the check, but recovery from the depositor would be
available only to the extent that the depositor had been unjustly
enriched. 47 Thus, the mere fact that the bank has purchased the
check from a holder in due course will not permit the bank to enforce
its payment from the depositor, if he had good cause for stopping
141. U.C.C. § 4-103.
142. Third Natl Bank v. Carver, supra note 132.
143. See note 138 supra.
144. Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 377, 193 S.W. 117, 122 (1917). See also note
76 supra; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-158 (1956). The bank's argument is based on the
fact that the prior holder in due course could have enforced payment from the
depositor if the stop order had been followed. The bank then claims that it acquires
the same right as an equitable purchaser from the holder in due course. The contra
argument is that the bank has paid at its peril in breach of contract, and the status
of the person paid is not relevant.
145. Unaka Natl Bank v. Butler, 113 Tenn. 574, 83 S.W. 655 (1904).
146. Pease & Dwyer v. State Nat'l Bank, supra note 132.
147. U.C.C. §§ 4-407(a),(b).
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payment. On the other hand, the bank is not estopped from recovering from the depositor merely because of its negligence in overlooking
the stop order, if the depositor had no cause for stopping payment
and was unjustly enriched by the bank's payment. The extent of
this change may not be accurately judged because of the ambiguities
in the present case law. 1 There is, however, a renunciation of the
principle that the loss should be placed according to mechanical
rules, and an attempt to settle accounts so that there is ultimately no
loss to anyone.
Banks in Tennessee have also argued that, as to the depositor, they
are subrogated to any rights the payee has against him on the underlying transaction and may recover on this ground even if they may not
recover from him on the check itself. This argument is important
where the depositor has stopped the check for no valid reason.
The Tennessee courts have never expressly ruled that this method
of recovery is available to banks under the present law, nor have
they expressly ruled that it is not available. 149 In all the decided
cases, the bank has automatically charged the depositor's account
and has not rescinded the charge during the suit. 50 In this situation
the courts have held, quite properly, that there can be no subrogation
to the rights of others until the bank has paid out its own money,
and that it has not paid out its own money, but the depositor's, as
long as the depositor's account is charged with the check. Thus, it
has not been necessary for the courts to decide whether there is any
right of subrogation against the depositor, and the question is probably
still open in this state. 151
. Under
the Code, the bank is subrogated to the rights of the payee
based on the underlying transaction, so that it may recover from the
depositor if he stopped payment for no valid reason. 52 Recovery is
available, however, only if the depositor has been unjustly enriched
at the bank's expense. 153 This is a clear answer to a problem probably
undecided under the present law, and a problem which has been
troublesome to banks. 4
148. See notes 145-46 supra.
149. Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking Co., supra note 132; Third Nat'l Bank
v. Carver, supra note 132.
150. Ibid.
151. Even if the bank does not charge the depositor's account, there may be other
hurdles to setting up a subrogation claim against him. For example, courts in other
states have required that the depositor ratify the original transaction before action
may be brought against him. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d
465 (1948). Such cases probably show a general reluctance to charge the depositor
for what is thought to be the negligence of the bank.
152. U.C.C. § 4-407(b).
153. Ibid.
154. The common law rules of subrogation would require that the bank not have
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Against prior parties, the present Tennessee law allows the bank
to proceed upon the check against at least such parties who were
not bona fide holders for value. Whether it may also proceed in this
manner against holders in due course is not clear from the one Tennessee case on point. 15 Courts in other jurisdictions have split on
this question, with a majority holding that the bank may not recover
156
from a holder in due course on a check it has paid over a stop order.
All jurisdictions agree, however, that a prior party, whether he has
the status of a holder in due course or not, may seek payment only if
he has no knowledge of the stop order. If he has such knowledge,
his lack of good faith in receiving payment will permit the bank to
recover on grounds of fraud or deceit. 15 7 Thus, if the payee cashes
the check and either has not-given value for it through the underlying transaction or has been informed of the drawer's attempt to stop
payment, the bank may recover its loss from him. 15
The bank's subrogation to the rights of the depositor against the
payee has not been passed upon by the Tennessee courts. It would
seem unnecessary for them to do so, since the bank's right of recovery
on the check itself already protects it from loss where the depositor
has stopped payment for good cause. Recovery on the check itself
is available in all cases where such subrogation is possible, and is
also available in other situations as well, making it a more useful
theory.
Under the Code, if the depositor stopped payment for good cause,
the bank must try to recover from the payee or prior holders, because the depositor will not have been unjustly enriched by the
bank's payment. The bank may not recover upon the check from
the payee or other prior holders, if their presentment for payment was
in good faith. Section 3-418 makes payments by the drawee final
against mistake of fact arguments, and there is no warranty of presentment by indorsers against overlooked stop payment orders. The
bank may still proceed against persons receiving payment with
knowledge of the attempted stop payment, on grounds of fraud or
charged the depositor's account before it attempts to recover from him. These rules
are not changed by the Code, but are incorporated into it by § 1-103.
155. Murfreesboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Travis, 190 Tenn. 429, 230 S.W.2d 658
(1950).
156. See 3 PATON 3475-77. The argument for the majority view is that the bank
is held to know the state of the depositor's account, including revocation orders, on
an analogy to Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). Therefore,
payment over a stop order cannot accurately be described as a "mistake of fact" so
that the bank has no right of charge back.
157. See 3 PATON 3477-79. Whether thiis knowledge is to be determined at the
time of receiving payment, or of procuring a certification, or of obtaining the instrument for a holder in due course is undecided.
158. Ibid.
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deceit. 159 The bank is, however, subrogated to the depositor's rights
against the payee under the underlying transaction, if the payee
has been unjustly enriched. 160 Thus, it may recover from the payee
where payment was stopped for good cause.1 1 Thus, again, the Code
has rejected mechanical rules for placing the loss caused by the
bank's payment and would give a clear answer to a problem not well
settled by the case law in this state.
When the bank seeks reimbursement for a check it has paid over
a stop order, it would prefer not to have to decide whether the stop
order was for good cause or not. It would also prefer not to bring
two separate actions, one against the depositor and one against the
payee, because the two juries may differ and the bank lose both
cases. Therefore, banks have attempted to assert claims against both
parties in the same action to obtain one consistent ruling on the
question presented. These attempts have failed, on procedural
grounds,'62 so that banks must continue to risk separate and inconsistent verdicts. Under the Code, the bank would probably still have
to decide which party had been unjustly enriched, or risk inconsistent
verdicts in two actions, one against the depositor and one against the
payee. This is because the Code does not attempt to change procedural rules, and the bank's dilemma under the present Tennessee
1
law is caused by procedural, not substantive-law, problems. 6
A stop payment order, to be effective, must be given to the bank
before the check is paid and must be given a sufficient time before
payment to enable the bank to notify its tellers and bookkeepers. Such
notification is a simple procedure where the bank has only a single
office, but is somewhat more complex for a bank having many widelyscattered branch offices. The depositor need not notify each of the
branches; it is the bank's duty to "spread the word" once the depositor
has notified one of the bank's offices. 164 In such a situation, the depositor's stop order must precede the payment of the check by enough
time for the bank to warn the employee who authorizes the payment.
The length of time the courts find necessary for this dissemination of
information is small. In one case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held
that twenty-five minutes was sufficient time to forward the stop order
159. Incorporated by U.C.C. § 1-103.
160. U.C.C. § 4-407(c).
161. The bank must probably still decide which party has been unjustly enriched,
or risk inconsistent verdicts in two actions, one against the depositor and one against
the payee. This problem is due to procedural rules, however, which the Code does
not attempt to change. See notes 162-63 infra.
162. Third Nat'l Bank v. Carver, supra note 132, cited with approval in Mullinax
v. American Trust & Banking Co., supranote 132.
163. U.C.C. § 1-103.
164. Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking Co., supra note 132.
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notice from one branch office to the bookkeeper of the depositor's
branch office, and the bank was liable for not having done so. 165
The rules requiring notice before payment are also applicable to
require notice before certification where a holder procures the certification. 6 A different problem arises, however, where the depositor
himself has procured the certification. Certification then does not
discharge the depositor from liability on the check,167 so that the

depositor arguably may still stop payment. There is no Tennessee
case on this point, and there is a split of authority on the question in
other jurisdictions. 16
The Code would not change the present rule that a stop payment
order, to be effective, must be given a sufficient time in advance of
payment to allow the bank to notify its employees. 1 Nor does the
Code attempt to define "sufficient time," so the present case law on
that subject would not be affected. It would, however, provide a
definite rule concerning stop orders received after certification of a
check. They would be ineffective, whether the certification was
procured by a holder or by the depositor himself.10
By statute in Tennessee, a stop order, once it has been given to the
bank, is effective for only six months, but may be renewed at the end
of that period. 71' The original order may be either oral or in writing, 172
but the renewal must be written. 1 3 The statutory provision requiring
a written renewal after six months does not seem very useful because
a six months old check is probably stale, thus putting the bank on
notice of any possible defect. 7 4
Under the Code, the original stop order may still be oral or written.
If it is oral, however, it would be valid for only fourteen days, and an
extension would be possible only by a written confirmation of the
original order.1 5 A written order, or a written confirmation of an oral
order would be valid for six months, but could be renewed in writ165. Ibid.
166. Third Nat'l Bank v. Carver, supra note 132.
167. N.I.L. § 188, TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-405 (1956).
168. See Merchants & Planters Bank v. New First Nat'l Bank, 116 Ark. 1, 170 S.W.
852 (1914) (drawer may not stop payment); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tomasello,
103 Fla. 1076, 139 So. 140 (1932). But see Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N.J. Eq.
644, 126 Ati. 435 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934) (drawer may stop payment).
169. U.C.C. § 4-403(1). See also § 1-201(27), which defines when notice to an
organization becomes effective.
170. U.C.C. § 4-303(la). This would provide a definite rule for another problem
not yet solved in Tennessee. See note 168 supra.
171. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 45-421 (1956).
172. Ibid. This rule apparently may be varied by provisions in the deposit contract.
Third Nat'l Bank v. Carver, supra note 132, at 530.
173. Ibid.
174. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
175. U.C.C. § 4-403(2).
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ing. 7 6 The written renewal provision of the Code would be effective
7
because of the provision that a bank may pay stale checks. 1
B. DEATH OF DEPOSrrOR
The death of the depositor operates in the same manner as a stop
payment order. When the bank receives notice of the depositor's
78
death, its power to pay his checks and charge his account is revoked.
The depositor's death alone does not revoke the bank's authority;
notice to the bank of the death is also required. 179 One problem for
the bank in this area is whether the bank is chargeable with constructive notice from such sources as items in newspapers. There is no
Tennessee case on this point, so the issue is undecided. 1 0 A second
problem is that many holders of checks issued shortly before death
must file a claim in probate to receive payment, even if the checks
are given in immediate payment of an obligation of the decedent.
Not only the holder and the estate, but also the bank, is burdened by
this formality, which is useless in most cases.
Under the Code, the death of a depositor would not revoke the
bank's authority to pay his checks until it has actual knowledge of his
death.18' Thus, newspaper notices could not revoke its authority to
pay, relieving the bank of any duty to scan such notices. Even after
knowing of the depositor's death, the bank could still pay any checks
drawn by him and received within ten days of the date of death,
unless ordered to stop such payments. 18 This is a novel provision
and allows the holders of checks drawn shortly before the death to
obtain payment without filing a claim in probate. This will reduce
the present burdens on the holders of such checks, the depositor's
estate, the bank, and the courts. Adequate safeguards are provided
through the possibility of claimants ordering payments from the
account stopped and through actions by executors to recover improper
payments from the persons paid.
176. Ibid.
177. U.C.C. § 4-404.

178. Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537
(1913); 7 Am. JuR. Banks § 606 (1937); BnrrroN 522; Feezer, Death of a Drawer of
a Check, 14 MiNN. L. REv. 124 (1929).
179. Ibid.
180. There is one Tennessee case, involving the death of the payee, which requires
actual knowledge. Darling Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 165,
156 S.W.2d 419 (1941). This does not necessarily determine the present question,
however, because the number of persons who may be payees is unlimited, while the

persons who are depositors are more known and of a limited number. Thus, the
amount and difficulty of the notice scanning required is quite different.
181. U.C.C. § 4-405(1).
182. U.C.C. § 4-405(2). Only persons claiming an interest in the account-executors,
administrators, surviving relatives, creditors-may stop such payments.
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V. TimE OF PAYMENT
The solutions to many of the problems discussed in the foregoing
sections depend on whether the check has been paid or not. For
example, this fact determines whether a forged check (drawer's
signature forged) may still be charged back to prior holders, whether
a check may still be validly dishonored to pay a garnishment or
banker's lien, and whether a stop payment order is requested in time
to be effective. Thus, in these situations the precise time when a
check may be said to be paid is quite important to the bank-depositor
relationship. The N.I.L. does not define what actions of the drawee
bank constitute payment, and therefore does not define the time at
which a check is paid,183 nor have the cases set up any clear and
distinct rules on this subject.T M
The Tennessee courts have distinguished between three types of
situations in defining when a check is paid. A check may be paid in
cash over the drawee bank's counter; a check drawn by one depositor
may be deposited in the drawee bank for credit to a second depositor;
and checks may be deposited in another bank for collection from the
drawee bank. The first situation presents no problem in determining
when the check is paid. Where a check is presented to the drawee
183. N.I.L. § 88, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-219 (1956), only defines what payments
are made in due course. N.I.L. § 137, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-311 (1956), provides

for constructive acceptance if the drawee takes no action within 24 hours after presentment, but this rule has been superseded by the Deferred Posting Statute. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 45-417 (1956).

The Bank Collection Code would have added more statutory

law on the subject, but Tennessee did not enact this legislation.
184. A good illustration is found in Malcolm, "Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collec-

tions" (outline used in connection with a speech delivered at The Symposium on Banking Law held at Vanderbilt University in May, 1962):
"Some Pre-Code rules as to time of final payment of item.
1. When check cashed over the counter by payor bank. Chambers v. Miller, 13
C.B.N.S. 125 (1862).

2. When check deposited to credit of account of holder in payor bank, regardless of
extent of processing. Cohen v. First National Bank of Nongales, 22 Ariz. 394, 400
(1921).
3. Contra, if payor bank has reserved a right of chargeback. Pollack v. National Bank

of Commerce, 168 Mo. App. 368, 374 (1912).
4. If appropriate employee of payor bank verifies that there are funds to cover and
stamps an item 'paid.' Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank, 184 Mass. 49
(1903). Contra: Hunt v. Security State Bank, 910 Oregon 362 (1919).
5. 'Fishback rule.' Bohlig v. First National Bank in Wadena, 48 N.W.2d 445 (Minn.

1951).
6. When an item charged to drawer's account and remittance draft mailed by payor

bank and accepted by collecting bank. Page v. Holmes-Darst Coal Co., 269 Mich.
159 (1939).
7. When account of collecting bank credited. Utah Const. Co., v. Western Pac. Ry.,
174 Cal. 156 (1919).
8. At election of collecting bank under certain circumstances. A.B.A. Code Sec. 11."
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for payment in cash, and cash is handed over the counter to the holder, the check has been paid under both the Tennessee case law' 85 and
the U.C.C.'6 After that time the bank may no longer return forged
checks, nor dishonor checks to pay garnishments, nor assert stop
payment orders.
Where both the holder and the drawer have accounts in one bank,
and the holder deposits the check in the drawee for credit (presentation of an "on us" item), the common-law rule is that the check 187
is
paid when the drawee places its amount to the holder's credit.
The common-law rule has been abrogated in Tennessee by the
adoption of the Deferred Posting Statute.1 88 That statute provides
that the bank may revoke any credit given until midnight of the day
after the check has been presented to the bank. 189 All of these
rules may, however, be modified by agreement or a contract between the parties, 90 and banks regularly employ such modification
contracts by printing them on their deposit slips. The modifying clauses currently in use in Tennessee allow the bank to charge
back until "close of business on day of deposit." 191 Thus the
banks seem, in this situation, to have waived the benefits available
to them under the Deferred Posting Statute, due to their own
affirmative action. At least, there is some question as to how
long after presentment a bank may still revoke credit. This situation
would not be changed by adoption of the U.C.C. The Code's
statutory rule allows the same delay as the Deferred Posting Statute.'1z
It also provides, however, that such statutory rules may be modified
by agreement; 19 so that, as now, the written agreements on the deposit slips would probably control the relations between the parties.
185. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat'l Bank, 173 F.2d 192, 199 (6th
Cir. 1949); Lebanon Bank & Trust Co. v. Grandstaff, 24 Tenn. App. 162, 169, 141
S.W.2d 924, 929 (M.S. 1940).
186. U.C.C. § 4-213(la).
187. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat'l Bank, supra note 185; Lebanon
Bank &Trust Co. v. Grandstaff, supra note 185.
188. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-417, -418 (1956).
189. The statute expressly provides that credit may be revoked after entries evidencing this credit have been made in the bank's books. The credits and the entries are
revoked by returning the item. Ibid.
190. Dean Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 173 Tenn, 365, 368-69,
117 S.W.2d 746 (1938), citing Federal Reserve Bank v. Mallory, 264 U.S. 160

(1924).
191. This time limit applies only to "on us" items-e.g., "Credit given for items
drawn on this bank not good at close of business of day of deposit may be charged
back to depositor."
192. U.C.C. §§ 4-301, -302. The Codes terminology is that the drawee bank may
retain the check until its "midnight deadline" without liability for inaction. The
"midnight deadline" refers to midnight on the day after the day of presentment. This
is the same deadline as is presently imposed by the Tennessee Deferred Posting
Statute. TENN. CODE AnN. § 45-417 (1956).
193. U.C.C. § 4-103.
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Regardless of the problems concerning the length of time the
bank may delay before revoking credit, there are also additional
problems concerning the effect of this ability to delay. Certainly the
ability to revoke credit after a delay allows the bank to charge back
due to insufficient funds, forgeries, garnishments, and stop orders
made before the presentment but discovered later.'9 The problem
arises, however, as to whether the bank must obey a garnishment or
stop payment order received after it has provided credit to the holder,
but while this credit is still revocable under the statute or deposit slip
agreement. A Tennessee court has held that the bank may obey such
orders when received after crediting the holder's account, although
it did not reach the question of whether the bank must obey such
orders.19

The Code recognizes that two distinct problems are involved and
treats each problem separately. Section 4-213 provides a series of
rules for determining whether a bank may still charge back due to a
discovery of insufficient funds, a forgery, or a previously-received
garnishment or a stop payment order. 196 In general, a bank may still
charge back for such reasons either until it has completed its posting
process or until the midnight deadline has passed without any posting
action. 197 Section 4-303, on the other hand, provides rules as to when
a garnishment or stop order must be received for the bank to honor
such an order and give it priority over a check presented for payment.1' Such an order is too late, not only if the midnight deadline
has passed, but also if the bank has already "evidenced... a decision
to pay the [check]."'u Thus, once the bookkeeper has "sight posted" 2 °
the check, even though the posting will not be completed until the
end of the day, the depositor may not order payment stopped; nor
may a creditor cause dishonor of the check by ordering the account
194. Traders' Nat1 Bank v. First Natl Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920);
First Nat Bank v. First Natl Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S.W. 965 (1913); U.C.C.

§ 4-303.

195. Lebanon Bank & Trust Co. v. Grandstaff, supranote 185.
196. Section 4-213 provides rules as to when fial payment occurs. Section 3-418
provides that payment is binding upon the drawee, except for breach of warranty
claim. No warranty is breached by a holder merely because the drawee failed to
discover the drawee's insufficiency of funds (U.C.C. § 3-418, comment 2), a forgery
of the drawer's signature (U.C.C. § 3-418, comment 1), or a stop payment order

(U.C.C. § 4-403(l) ).
197. See note 192 supra.
198. The deadline for the assertion of a banker's lien or set-off is also covered by

the same rule.
199. U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (d). "Midnight deadline" is defined at note 192 supra.
200. Le., the bookkeeper has examined the account and has made a decision to pay
the check, but has postponed making the posting entries. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3.

See also U.C.C. § 4-109, defining "process of posting," and comments thereto.
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attached; nor may the drawee dishonor the check by asserting a banker's lien.201
Where a check drawn on one bank is deposited in another bank for
collection, the check must be transferred to the drawee bank before
payment can occur.202 The drawee must have an opportunity to
check its records and take action upon them before it is obligated
to pay a check sent to it for collection.20 3 In Tennessee, the nature of
the action required for payment of such a check depends upon the
relationship between the drawee and the collecting banks. Where
these banks maintain reciprocal accounts, and credit is transferred
through them, the check is paid when the collecting bank is credited
on the drawee bank's books. 204 The collecting bank does not need to
receive notification of this credit for payment to be final.205 On the
other hand, where payment is to be made by remittance draft, the
check is not paid until the remittance draft has been actually received
by the collecting bank.2 6 Thus, the drawee bank may still decide to
201. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 194, at 215, 154 S.W.
at 967. A check was held not yet "accepted" after it had been stamped "Paid" because
the cancellation mark was later erased. "Acceptance" was held to require that the
posting process have been completed. Id. at 216, 154 S.W. at 968.
202. Until the drawee has paid the check, the collecting bank is merely an agent
for its collection. Dean Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, supra note
190. This is usually expressly stated in the deposit slip. If a chain of collecting banks
is used for a long-distance collection, each collecting bank is an agent of the holder
and is not an agent of the depository bank. Ibid. Thus, the depository bank is only
responsible for selecting a suitable correspondent bank to forward the check for the
holder, and is not liable for that bank's negligence. Bank of Louisville v. First Nat'l
Bank, 67 Tenn. 101 (1874). The U.C.C. would continue these rules. U.C.C. §§
4-201, -202.
A collecting bank may, however, become a holder of the check by giving a right to
draw immediately against the check, before the proceeds are collected. The collecting
bank may also become a holder by making advances, but this is not necessary to the
bank's title if it has given its customer the right to make immediate withdrawals.
First Trust & Sav. Bank v. Kent, 119 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1941); Flat Creek Say. Bank
-v. Federal Reserve Bank, 15 Tenn. App. 527 (M.S. 1932). Cf. DeJarnett v. First Nat'l
Bank, 1 Tenn. App. 191 (M.S. 1925) (collection of bills of lading, not a check). The
Code gives a bank a security interest in such items, and gives it the status of a holder
in due course to the extent that it has a security interest. U.C.C. § 4-208, -209.
For a thorough discussion of collection problems, which is outside the scope of this

article, see Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HAIv. L. REv. 905 (1949); Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With
Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265.
203. N.I.L. § 74, TENN. ConE ANN. § 47-205 (1956). The check must be exhibited
to the drawee, the person from whom payment is demanded. N.I.L. § 137, TENN.
4CODE ANN. § 47-311 (1956), gives the drawee 24 hours to decide whether to accept
or pay a check, or to refuse to do so.
204. Dean Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, supra note 190; First
Trust & Say. Bank v. Kent, supra note 202, at 156.
205. Ibid.
206. Traders' Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 194.
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dishonor a check for insufficient funds after mailing a remittance
draft, but before its actual delivery to the collecting bank.20 7 Presumably, the drawer of a check may also require the drawee to stop
the payment of the check after a remittance draft has been mailed,
if the remittance draft may still be withdrawn from the mails.=
However, the Deferred Posting Statute now applies to all of these
situations, allowing the bank to charge back until midnight of the day
after presentment, after crediting the collecting bank, or even after
a remittance draft has been received.09 Presumably, therefore, the
drawee bank should obey a garnishment or stop order received at
any time on the day after presentment, regardless of any payment
action it has initiated.
The U.C.C. would again recognize the different problems involved
and provide separate rules for each problem. Section 4-213 would
allow the bank to charge back, due to the discovery of insufficient
funds, a forgery, or a previously received garnishment or stop payment order, until the bank had completed its posting process.2 10
Section 4-303, on the other hand, would prevent the depositor or a
third person from forcing the bank to dishonor a check, through use
of a stop payment or garnishment order, once the bank had proceeded sufficiently with its posting process to evidence a decision to
pay the check.21 ' Neither may the bank dishonor a check by exercising a banker's lien or set-off after it has progressed to such a point in
posting the check.212 The Code also provides that payment becomes
final after the midnight deadline, but this standard is to be used only
if the bank fails to initiate the posting process before that time.2 13
207. Ibid.
208. No Tennessee case has yet ruled upon this issue, but the bank would seem
obligated to follow its depositor's orders to protect his interests in any case where it
could protect its own interests. Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W.2d
445 (1951). And the Tennessee courts have held that the drawee bank can protect
its own interests by withdrawing the remittance check from the mails. Traders' Nat'l
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 194.
209. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 45-417, -418 (1956). The problems, caused by the use of
clauses printed on the deposit slips which limit the time for charging back checks,
would not arise where the check is being collected through another bank. The deposit
slip time limitation clauses presently inuse are expressly limited to "on us" items. See
note 191 supra.
210. Once the posting process has been completed, final payment has occurred.
Notification to the collecting bank of this crediting is not required. U.C.C. § 4-213,
comment 2. This rule conforms to the present Tennessee law. See text accompanying
note 205 supra.
211. U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (c). See note 200 supra.
212. Ibid. As to other considerations which might prevent the drawee from asserting a banker's lien after presentment of the check, see note 120 supra.
213. U.C.C. § 4-302. The "midnight deadline" permits the same delay as does the
Tennessee Deferred Posting Statute. TENN. CODE, ANN. § 45-417 (1956). See note
192 supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Very few of the problems discussed in this article are determined
by statute in the present Tennessee Code. N.I.L. section 23 provides
the broadly stated basic rule on the effect of a forged signature, but
does not solve most of the practical problems which arise in defective
check transactions. For a solution to such problems, the Tennessee
attorney must consult the case-law gloss extending back to Price v.
Neal.214 Neither the N.I.L. nor any other part of the Tennessee Code
provides any statutory authority for the solution of the many problems involving stop payment orders.215 The time when payment of a
check occurs is not set out in any statute, except for the Deferred
Posting Statute provision
regarding the maximum possible delay in
2 16
payment allowed
Lack of statutory solutions to such problems is not per se bad, but
it does have certain disadvantages. First, not all of the factual situations in this area have come before the Tennessee courts. Thus, this
state has no settled answer to many of these problems.211 This is true
even in areas where the courts have pronounced language which
seems sufficiently broad to cover all possible situations. 218 This lack
of specific decisions prevents Tennessee attorneys from accurately
advising clients on some business decisions. And, even though decisions from other states may be used to "fill in the gaps" in Tennessee law, at times these states offer only a confusing split of authority. 219
A second disadvantage is the conflict of decisions and language which
is present not only in cases from other jurisdictions, but also in cases
decided within our own borders.220
A third disadvantage concerns the attorney's search for answers to
such problems. Where the authority consists entirely of case decisions,
the Tennessee Code Annotated is not much help in research. The
entire Tennessee Reports, or the entire West Reporter System, must
be consulted to find an answer. This, in turn, involves utilizing a
battery of secondary sources to locate the proper cases.
A fourth disadvantage is that case law originated before the widespread use of clearing houses may impede the handling of checks
214. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). N.I.L. § 23 has no application
to the drawees right to charge defective checks back to prior holders, nor do §§ 62
or 66. See note 76 supra. Nor does the word "precluded" in § 23 precisely define
either the conduct encompassed or the theory of preclusion. See, e.g., notes 40, 50, &
54 supra.
215. The one attempt in Tennessee to use an N.I.L. section (§ 58) to solve a stop
order problem failed due to a split of authority in the two Tennessee decisions on the
point. See notes 144-46 supra.
216. TmaqN. CoDE ANN. § 45-417 (1956).

217.
218.
219.
220.

See, e.g., notes 55, 72, 83, 93, 107, 151, 155, 168, 195 & 208 supra.
See, e.g., notes 43, 180, 195 & 209 supra.
See, e.g., notes 100, 108, 151, 156, 168 & 184 supra.
See, e.g., notes 57, 108, 132, 144-46 & 201 supra.
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under modem conditions.221 This is especially true in regard to the
use of electronic computers to process checks.2
Adoption of the U.C.C. would not eliminate all of the problems
caused by these disadvantages of case-law authority. It would,
however, provide answers to many problems presently undecided in
this state. 2 -3 It would also provide these answers in a single body of
authority, with a corresponding decrease in the amount of conflicting
language. 224 And, although the U.C.C. is a large volume with complex

language, it is smaller than the Tennessee Reports and has a table of
contents and cross-indexing. Further, it has been expressly designed

to be flexible in changing conditions and to allow the use of improved
check collection methods by permitting variations, with limitations,
of the statutory rules by Federal Reserve regulations, clearing house

rules, and the like.
221. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 77 & 180 supra.
222. For example, an electronic data processing center might be established for the
presentation and handling of checks for a group of banks or for one large bank having
many branches. If this center were established at a location where there was no
office of any member bank, no effective presentation of checks for payment could be
made under the N.I.L. N.I.L. §§ 72(3), 73. Thus, drawers and endorsers would
not be bound under § 70. There would be no such problem under U.C.C. § 3-504.
223. See, e.g., notes 64, 83, 98, 152, 160, 170, 196-99 & 213 supra.
224. See, e.g., notes 49, 61, 101, 147, 152, 170, 181, 196-99 &213 supra.
225. See note 222 supra, and U.C.C. § 4-103 and comments.

